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This dissertation was written as a part of my master. The purpose of this paper is to 
study the impact of oil and energy price changes on a set of Stock Markets and their 
returns in countries throughout the globe. This study uses international multi-factor 
models allowing both unconditional and conditional risk factors. I use the related 
literature studying the risk of oil stocks and the behavior of the stock markets as a result 
of oil shocks. 
I analyze the components of oil price change in order to investigate the relationship 
between oil price risk and the returns of various Stock Markets.  
Thus, this thesis will examine and show the possible asymmetric impact of risk between 
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The number of factors influencing stock returns is one of the most challenging areas of 
research in economics. Whether oil price risk affects stock returns is currently 
something that cannot be safely determined. Any change in the price of oil affects stock 
returns in many ways. The discounted amount of cash flows estimated by the stock is 
theoretically used to measure its value. Changes in oil prices are likely to affect 
economic conditions such as interest rates, production costs and economic growth in 
the future. Accordingly, movements in the price of oil affect stock returns. 
There have been several studies examining the relationship between oil prices and stock 
returns. For example, Juncal Kunado and Fernando Perez de Gracia (2014) investigated 
the large impact of oil price fluctuations on stock returns in European countries. Their 
research suggests that oil price shocks may have a negative impact on net stock returns. 
Previous studies have examined the impact of changes in oil prices on stock returns, 
market levels or sector levels. There is considerable gap in the literature for research 
that considers the impact of oil shaking price on real economy returns as a price factor 
directly in the context of a multi-factor property price model. 
Many studies show that knowledge about the impact of oil prices on global stock returns 
does not provide a global perspective. 
As the most strategic asset on the planet, the impact of crude oil prices on the capital 
market has been extensively studied in the financial markets literature, focusing on the 
impact on the stock markets. 
By recognizing the difference between oil supply and demand fluctuations, the rapidly 
growing literature has shifted its focus to determining whether the impact of oil price 
on financial markets is due to supply or demand-based factors. This section of the paper 
mainly reports that demand and supply shocks have a broader impact on financial 
markets. This is not the equivalent of an unannounced oil price shock. 
Although many studies have targeted the stock markets, the current evidence on the 
relationship between oil price fluctuations and bond markets is insufficient. 
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Economic factors have adequately identified in the literature how oil price shocks affect 
stock market movement. Crude oil is the most strategic asset on the planet, and has 
become an important force behind geopolitical threats, macroeconomic trends, market 
reaction and corporate revenues. It is widely accepted that changes in the oil industry 
will have a significant impact on the global economy and capital markets (Sofia B. 
Ramos, Helena Vega 2013). 
In theory, oil price fluctuations affect stock values by: 
- Potential cash flows, because oil price shocks can change production costs. They can 
bring about unsatisfactory changes in the demand for goods 
- Discount rates. Rising oil prices are often accompanied by inflationary pressures. 
They will eventually display higher discount rates reflecting stock prices. 
Furthermore, there is evidence in recent history that similar behavior with the oil and 
stock markets may reflect concerns about economic growth (Chun-da Chen, Chiao 
Ming Cheng, Riza Demirer 2017), and global demand is declining. Reduces both oil 
prices and stock markets. 
There is also the argument that fluctuations in oil prices affect market perceptions in 
relation to potential economic conditions. This is reflected in the risk associated with 
the required return. 
Although the relationship between the equity and dynamics of the oil market is clear, it 
is not clear how fluctuations in oil prices will affect bond markets. 
One argument in this regard is that significant fluctuations in oil prices due to supply 
alter inflation expectations, which are expressed in bond yields. 
From the observation of bond markets we can see that the impact of oil price shocks is 
not limited to capital market returns but also affects bond markets. This happens after 
adjusting for discount rate shocks and stock market effects. 
Unlike financial markets, the impact on sovereign bonds is stable and largely affected 
by shocks related to oil demand. 
The greater variance of bond return risk exposure in response to oil price shocks is the 




In addition, the disproportionate impact of demand shock on equity and bond markets 
has opened up the possibility of implementing a dynamic asset allocation strategy in 
which assets are converted by the stock and bond markets based on the intensity and 
severity of the oil price shock. 
These results show that crude oil status is an indicator of global growth aspirations, not 
only as a product, but also in global equity and bond markets, as well as global 
economic trends. 
Much of the literature is that oil prices are not external, and the main factors influencing 
them are demand over demand, and also supply for consumer goods and oil. (Sofia B. 
Ramos, Helena Vega 2013). 
The response of investment returns to the growing oil price shocks on the demand sector 
of the economy. The most effective catalysts of stock market returns are the oil price 
shocks produced on the supply economy size. 
There is nothing in recent academic studies that predicts the impact of oil price 
fluctuations on stock market profits. An examination of the basic variables that affect 
stock market returns. 
The share price is equal to the estimated number of potential dividends deductions. That 
is, systematic variable gains that change stock prices affect the estimated return and 
discount rate. Part of the oil price fluctuation is important in oil price fluctuations. 
Stock market variables are taken from a large number of known predictive factors. The 
list includes dividend price relationships, default spreads, volatility of stock returns, as 
well as late returns, firm bond returns and net equity growth. Those factors have 
significant power dissipation in terms of stock market returns. 
It is a safe bet that there is a negative relationship between stock market returns and the 
volatility of oil prices, which begin with a setback in determining oil demand. The rise 
in oil prices has had a small impact on capital market returns due to oil supply shocks. 
On the other hand, its impact will be further enhanced when the backlash hits global 
demand for rising oil prices (Chun-da Chen, Chiao Ming Cheng, Riza Demirer 2017). 
Rising oil prices are having an impact on industries by increasing the supply price of 
products. This setback increases the production cost of companies as well as the 
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shipping cost of everything related to the product. In terms of demand, it can increase 
or decrease the demand for industrial products, depending on the source of the shock 
and the affected industries. If the rise in oil prices leads to economic growth, demand 
for all industrial goods will increase. 
On the other hand, due to the growing demand from alternative energy industries such 
as coal, the demand for the industrial sector is low.  
A study of a segment of the stock market to differentiate other sectors or markets, 
analyzing the effect of oil market on stock market sectors. Results of such studies focus 
on the relationship between the price of oil and the return of an industry to the stock 
market or commodity market. This approach is important because it gives a 
straightforward picture of the transmission channel across the market as opposed to the 
resulting impact on the stock exchange, in which the positive or detrimental effects on 
the sectors face each other. 
According to the results of sector level studies, companies influence both the cost side 
and the market for the final product. Although the total energy cost is significant, it is 
not enough to understand the variability in stock return responses in industries. 
This exploration emphasizes traditional knowledge on oil price shocks as input cost 
shocks. For many industries, especially those that are less dependent on oil, the return 
to oil price shocks is more likely to be caused by changes in demand for products and 
services than changes in production costs. 
Market products and services, sports and retail markets are some examples of this. In 
addition, it was found that demand in the oil market, the decline in the luxury goods 
and steel sector will push up oil prices, while the value of precious metals will rise and 
the oil sector will not be affected. We receive the result as a transition to the balance of 
the investment portfolio of the market participants, and then the oil market 
unexpectedly increased unexpectedly. If the reason for the rise in oil prices is the global 






The connection between oil prices and stock returns can be of negative or positive 
nature. 
As a result of current justification in theory, a great portion of the literature has 
attempted to check the cash flow hypothesis of property values that are a result of cash 
inflows. 
According to cash flow theory, there may be a positive or negative relationship between 
stock returns and oil prices. The existence of negative interactions is indicated by the 
presence of two networks. 
For starters, since oil is an important factor for the majority of businesses, high oil prices 
increase production costs, reduce potential cash flow, sales, dividends and asset returns. 
Second, rising oil prices predict inflation and higher nominal interest rates. Income, 
dividend and equity gains are lower as interest rates have the role of getting used for 
the estimate of future cash flows. 
The third approach refers to positive or negative interactions. Sensitivity to fluctuations 
in oil prices over the risk premium portion of the cash flow and discount rate during 
side effects of demand are determined by the volatility of the oil price Hamilton (2009). 
Sensitivity to oil prices can have a positive or negative effect on oil prices depending 
on the risk premium indicated, which can vary greatly between companies and time. 
Another explanation for the favorable relationship between oil prices and stock returns 
is that investors can equate rising oil prices with a rising economy. 
Consequently, high oil prices have a positive trade performance and as a result have an 
impact on the stock market. In these ways, Hamilton (2009) predicts that before the 
global financial crisis, rising oil prices will indicate high levels of inflation and 
corporate confidence in emerging markets. Current research suggests that fluctuations 
of oil price and stock market movements have a positive correlation. 
This partnership is influenced by time-changing price movements, in which investors 
are associated with uncertainty for oil price fluctuations. 
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According to Killian & Park (2009) how stock returns respond to oil prices can be either 
negative or positive. It is determined by the essence of the shock. Demand shocks create 
a negative relationship between oil prices and stock returns, so there are speculations 
that there will be a shortage of oil in supply. Meanwhile, the sudden rise in global 
growth has led to an increase in oil prices producing a favorable relationship between 
oil prices and stock returns. 
They noted that at the economic cycle start, there seems to be a favorable link to stock 
returns and oil prices, indicating that higher demand for industrial goods will increase 
both stock returns and oil prices. 
Nevertheless, the connection to the oil-related stock market is likely to decline in the 
long run. 
Ghazi Salah Uddin, Lutfur Rahman, Syed Jawad Hussain Shahzad, and Mobeen Ur 
Rehman (2018) found that there is a difference between low and high volatility with 
respect to demand and supply shocks using the two-stage Markov switching strategy. 
According to Signer (2013), a positive attachment is inadvertently permanent. 
Rising oil prices do not lead to negative stock returns every time. Long-term upheavals 
in the oil and stock markets are possible. 
Oil prices and stock returns 
Much of  preliminary research focuses on the impact of oil prices on total stock returns 
for individual countries or country classes. Most tests showed a negative association. 
However, many researchers have found a positive interaction. 
There are also researches that have found that there is no distortion relationship or any 
relationship between oil prices and stock returns. There are several explanations for 
these mixed performances, which we will discuss in more detail below. The first is that 
for the most part these analyzes do not take into account any level of inequality that 
companies in the overall index have to gain or stand to gain from changes in oil prices. 
According to Mollick and Assefa (2013), there is no explanation as to why oil prices 
have a similar effect on the overall index, whether or not the stock index is a collection 
of companies that have profited as a result of oil price volatility. 
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Secondly, mixed results can be defined by the differences in oil dependence between 
companies on stock exchanges around the world. 
There is an important reason why so much research on the relationship between oil 
prices and total stock returns is inversely related, especially where the United States 
and countries with large oil consumption, such as most European countries and Canada, 
have strong support. Expected from cash flow theory. 
Furthermore, all reports and the first of them, Killian and Park (2009), find it difficult 
to consider the essence of the shock. For the most part these reports are that the price 
of oil and the stock return connection fluctuate over time. These reports, which have a 
negative correlation between pre-1999 oil prices and stock returns, have become 
exceptionally low-pronounced in the new millennium or perhaps reflect the commodity 
bubble. 
The existence of asymmetric effects of oil price 
shocks on stock returns 
Numerous experiments have shown that fluctuations in oil prices have disproportionate 
effects on macroeconomic factors and on the cost of gasoline. 
Much research on the connection between oil prices and stock returns has shown that 
the underlying variables are adjusted in a linear and symmetrical way. 
Mollick and Assefa (2013), give a theoretical explanation of how oil prices have an 
unequal impact on market returns. The best decision for companies that trade openly is 
to pay a dividend only when their estimated value exceeds the current limit. A change 
in oil prices will reduce the estimated value of future cash flows or allow the company 
to pay higher dividends. 
If the oil price rises and falls below the current price range, the company chooses not 
to pay dividends, which reduces stock prices. 
If the price of oil falls, the company increases its payoff, resulting in a higher stock 
price. 
Afees A. Salisu, Ibrahim D. Raheem, Umar B. Ndako (2019) state that the negative 
impact of the previous will affect the positive impact of the rise in stock prices. 
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We also have a scenario of indirect disproportionate effects by the discount rate if the 
monetary authority manages interest rates differently in response to the rise and fall of 
oil prices. 
However, other tests showed no signs of unequal effects. Sujatha Saha (2017) did not 
give hints about inequality before the great financial crisis, but explores her unequal 
results before and during the crisis. According to Ramos and Vega (2013), oil-
importing countries have unequal results, but not countries that export oil. In general, 
best evidence suggests that oil prices pose an unequal effect on market returns. 
The majority of analysis that fails to detect disproportionate effects uses total stock 
returns. Total stock returns can be combined with total stock indices due to the effects 
of positive and negative oil price shocks. 
There are many indications that the connection of oil price and stock returns is simple, 
which is associated with unequal results between oil prices and stock returns. 
Response of stock returns to different types of oil 
price shocks 
Killian & Park (2009) stated that the rise in oil prices will have different effects on 
stock returns, which depends on the severity of the systemic shock. They mentioned 
three categories of structural shocks. 
Unexpected variation in petroleum demand is reflected by the oil supply shock. Macro 
market shocks indicate fluctuations in world demand for oil related commodities to the 
world economic cycle. 
Shocks in the market that have to do with oil accelerate demand as a result of concerns 
over oil shortages. 
Killian and Park (2009) argue for experiments that fail to distinguish between demand 
and supply tremors. They take on the response to stock returns on the impact of the 
average oil price, and their forecasts find no impact or have a volatility percentage. 
Killian & Park (2009) found that stock demand shocks and demand shocks that have to 
do with oil are of greater significance in understanding stock returns than global oil 
supply shocks, as well as oil-specific demand shocks on United States stock returns. 
Effects and overall demand shocks affect stock returns in a positive way. 
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Outcome of oil supply shocks. Hamilton (2009) concludes that oil supply shocks are 
generally not related to macroeconomic trends. Kang (2016) distinguishes between 
domestic and non-domestic oil production. In this situation, they found that the United 
States oil supply shocks, along with the increase in demand since 2009, will positively 
affect United States stock returns. Unlike Killian and Park (2009), the United States' oil 
supply is associated with shock demand. 
According to Kang and Ratti (2013), the importance of oil supply shocks and overall 
demand shocks have grown over time to understand the variability in stock returns in 
the United States, while gross demand shocks are more important and oil demand 
supply shocks are of lesser importance.  
Numerous tests for other countries have led to conflicting decisions for oil supply 
shocks. According to some reports, oil production shocks have a positive effect on 
market returns. Other research has found that moving oil production can have a 
detrimental effect on storage returns. According to Apergis and Miller (2009), 
disruptions in oil supply in eight developed countries have a modest impact on storage 
revenues. 
Amidst the demand shake, subsequent research by Killian and Park (2009) found 
widespread support, finding that overall demand shocks affect positively stock returns 
and demand shocks that have to do with oil produce a negative impact. 
Oil production shocks have non-existent effect, although mixed demand shocks sparkle 
an increase in oil prices and stock yields, while shocks of real demand for oil have a 
negative impact on net oil consuming countries but have a positive impact on Norway 
who is a net oil exporter. The impact of three types of shocks on the stock returns varies 
greatly among different industries. 
 The oil price and stock return time variation 
Inequalities in oil price and stock return connections happen when stock returns react 
differently to oil prices during low and high economic fluctuations such as a recession 
or bounce. Volatility can be triggered by global factors such as financial crises or 
financial tensions or conflicts that change the behavior of oil markets or stock returns. 
Before, during and after the Great Financial Crisis, U.S. stock returns reacted 
differently to oil price shocks (Mollick and Asefa 2013). 
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Miller and Ratti (2009) concluded that the negative relationship between oil prices and 
equity returns in the foreign exchange market would disappear after September 1999. 
Numerous experiments have shown that the connection of oil price and stock returns is 
different over time and is not simple, it also turns out to be a response to economic and 
oil shaking, mainly using the frequency domain, Markov switching VAR, regime 
change model or wavelet decay. 
Using nonparametric panel data modeling, there is evidence for major nonlinear effects 
on oil and stock market connections in oil-importing countries. 
In addition to economic tremors, many researchers have used non-linear models to 
analyze the effect of various external shocks on the oil price-stock return connection. 
According to Kollias, Kyrtsou and Papadamou (2013), cooperation between oil prices 
and stock revenues in the US and major European markets has declined and uncertainty 
has increased since the first stages of Iraq's two wars, but lie under the influence of 
terrorist attacks. 
Bouri, Awartani, and Maghyereh (2016) found that the impact of oil prices on Jordan's 
financial and service stocks had waned since the Arab Spring in 2010. 
Similarly, Bharn and Nikolovann (2010) found that after the terrorist attacks of 2001, 
the relationship between Iraq's initial invasion in 2006 and civil strife, oil prices, and 
Russian stock returns became negative.  
According to Cameron and Schnusenberg (2009), the negative correlations found 
between oil prices and United States carmakers' stock returns increased after the First 
Iraq War. In general, those results indicate that external events may cause a rise in 
uncertainty in oil prices or capital markets, resulting in a low ability of movement in oil 
price and stock return connections. 
However, conflicts of geopolitical and civil nature increase the impact of oil prices on 
stock returns and create a negative relationship between them, making them more 
effective at extracting data from isolated terrorist attacks than market conflicts.  
This could happen if economic instability raises concerns over energy supply. This 
situation is related to the literature. For example demand shocks related to oil are likely 
to apply a negative impact on stock returns. 
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Any study has seen how significant changes in oil prices affect different stock returns. 
According to these results, large negative or positive oil price fluctuations pose an 
unequal effect on stock returns, with a greater impact in the lower quarter compared to 
the upper quarter. 
Such results often rely on time and are affected by financial crises and stock market 
conditions. Data are anlysed for three mature economies and five emerging markets. 
Before the great financial crisis, unequal effects arose, but they were small, but they 
became more apparent after the crisis. For the G7 markets, Lee & Zeng (2011) found 
that the disproportionate impact of significant oil price fluctuations on the lower and 
upper volumes of equity returns varies between markets and leads in recessionary 
growth. 
 
The oil price and stock return in various sectors 
 
The disadvantage of using total stock return data is that it obscures the variation in oil 
price and stock return connections among industries. 
Mature markets exhibit greater diversity. This suggests that consolidated equity 
indices represent the average of many industries, while most markets are focused on a 
few. 
In studies using gross stock returns, the final relationship between oil prices and stock 
returns depends on the regional structure of the market. Several analyzes are now 
available that study oil price and stock return connections at the industry level. Most 
of them are for US, European or G7 economies. 
Unlike China, which has many sectoral studies, there are fewer studies to change 
emerging markets or markets. Nandha and Faff (2008), who studied the connection 
between oil prices and 35 global industry indicators, made a very comprehensive 
analysis in terms of regional breadth. 
A major finding in these analyzes is that rising oil prices have had a positive impact 
on the market returns of oil companies. El-Sharif, Brown, Nixon, and Russell (2005) 
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found that the oil markets had a less positive effect on oil and gas revenues in the 
United Kingdom. 
In the Killian & Park (2009) system, Kang and Ratti (2013) distinguished between oil 
supply shaking and total demand shaking at oil companies. 
They think that oil supply shocks, responsible for supply fluctuations, will adversely 
affect oil stock returns, simplifying the various aftershocks. Meanwhile, overall 
demand shocks apply a positive impact on oil stock returns. 
The second big finding is that in areas where oil has the highest production cost, rising 
oil prices related to manufacturing and transportation can have a negative impact on 
stock returns. According to Nanda and Faff (2008), oil prices have a negative 
relationship with manufacturing company revenue. 
In a study on the subject, Aggarwal (2012) found that rising oil prices could have a 
negative impact on transportation company revenue. These results suggest a 
contradictory link between rising oil prices and car manufacturers' stock returns, which 
could have a greater impact on SUV manufacturers. 
Analysis of Kristjanpoller and Concha (2016) comes to a different conclusion. They 
found that rising oil prices could have an effect on aviation stock returns that is 
positive. Although fuel is significant cost to airlines, the authors analyze that the 
improvement in fuel costs is linked to economic growth and air travel demand. 
The authors claim that overall demand shocks are dominant. Although it is impossible 
to say whether or not this will break the shock form. 
The third major outcome shows that oil prices justify changes in renewable energy 
company stock revenues. Increasing oil prices have a positive impact on stock 
revenues in the renewable energy sectors (Kumar & Managi 2012). We have 
indications that this connection did not exist and strengthened over time, especially 





The oil price and stock return relationship in the 
firms 
 
The researchers used company level data to analyze the relationship between oil prices 
and stock returns. 
Company level data has the advantage of allowing more disagreement than sector-level 
data and can detect diversity in sector shares. According to Narayan and Sharma (2011), 
an individual return to the New York Stock Exchange reflects changes in oil prices and 
the extent to which they are related, and these results are widely used in various studies. 
According to Narayan & Narayan (2014), when the oil price touched one hundred dollars 
per barrel, it had an impact of negative nature on the company's earnings on the New 
York Stock Exchange, for a declining pattern, 1600 stocks in various stocks and var 
shares. Reduced. Ways. Phan (2015) researched how the oil system affects the stock 
returns of oil consumers rather than oil suppliers. 
Most papers use company level data to examine how strong oil prices are on stock prices. 
These reports suggest that oil prices in medium or large companies (Sadarsky 2008) were 
different from market returns before the Great Recession. 
According to Sujata Saha (2017), companies can mitigate negative quantitative-effects 
after a great financial crisis. 
Gupta (2016) researched how company data from 70 countries affect the relationship 
between oil prices and stock returns. He said oil and gas companies were less responsive 
to oil price shocks. The outcome is that consumer power reduces the volatility of a 







The oil price and stock return relationship in net oil    
importers and net oil exporters 
 
Price of oil in countries that export oil are expected to have different impact on stock 
returns than in countries importing oil. The rise in oil prices will have a positive impact 
on stock earnings in countries that export oil as domestic profits rise. Meanwhile, 
since oil is one of the most important variables in demand, raising oil prices can 
adversely affect stock returns in countries that import oil. 
 
Most reports examine the relationship between oil prices and stock earnings for oil 
buyers and exporters. Some reports focus on one or more countries that consume pure 
oil. 
These studies have found that the rise in oil prices in general has a positive impact on 
stock-exporting countries and is negative in oil-importing countries. 
Some research has studied the impact of the various types of aftershocks listed by 
Killian and Park (2009) on oil exporting and oil importing countries. The results were 
mixed. 
 
Kunado and de Gracia (2014) concluded that oil production fluctuations can have a 
detrimental effect on market markets by focusing only on oil-importing countries. 
According to Phillis (2011), demand shocks have a positive effect on the share prices 
of all oil importers and exporters, especially oil demand. Oil supply shocks do not 
affect stock prices between exporters and importers of oil. 
 
According to Wang (2013), oil supply disruptions that promote petroleum production 
often increase stock prices in countries that import oil. Rise in demand will reduce 
costs, but relations with oil-exporting countries are unclear. Stock prices eventually 
fall, but long-term growth indicates the difference in price flexibility between long-
term and short-term demand of oil. 
Wang (2013) found that the overall demand shake-up will have a positive impact on 
the financial markets of oil importing and oil-exporting countries, with results 
remaining stable over the next period.  
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Role of volatility in the oil price and stock returns 
relationship 
Research has been conducted to find out how uncertainty affects the impact of oil 
markets on stock returns. Choi and Hammoudeh (2010) identify high and low volatility 
regimes and based on them they decide for investors. 
Some researchers analyze the prevalence of volatility between oil and stock markets 
using data from Europe. Their research shows high indication of volatility as oil is the 
biggest spillover in financial markets (Arouri and Nguyen 2010). 
Their research suggests that the volatility between the two markets is small. The authors 
use this knowledge to achieve the hedging tangle. These results from Europe and the 
United States are also available to emerging markets such as Ghana. 
Lin, Wesseh, and Appiah (2014) have considerable evidence for instability prevalence 
and hedging efficiency. Overall, these observations of the large-scale spillover effect 
were also observed by Kang (2015) who use a more structured VAR model than the 
GARCH type model used by Choi and Hammoudeh (2010). 
Salisu and Oloko (2015) combine these experiments with systemic isolation research. 
They demonstrate that structural breaks can have a significant impact on the spread of 
stock market volatility. 
The impact of oil price fluctuations on stock returns has also been reported. Using US 
sector data, Elyasiani (2011) demonstrates that oil futures earnings volatility can further 
affect the revenues of the oil consumption industry. Narayan and Sharma (2015) 
researched if oil prices affect stock market volatility. 
They note the broader impact of oil prices on market return volatility and argue about 








INVESTIGATING THE OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
Flow Supply Shocks  
According to Hamilton (2003) any identification problem can be ignored for all 
practical purposes, a significant change in the price of oil trace oil supply interruptions 
due to exposed political activity in the Middle East.  
The 1973 Yom Kippur War, then the 1973-1974, 1978-1979 Arab Oil Embargo, 1980-
1988 Iran - Iraq War, 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Venezuela Crisis, 2002 and 2003 
Iraq War, and 2011 Libyan historical examples are uprisings. Inequality accordingly to 
the American economy means that these events did not happen as a result of the current 
or previous state of the American economy. 
This theory suffers from three shortcomings. For starters, this may not always be 
consistent with the results. Despite the fact that the 1973 Arabia and Israel war was 
publicly boycotted for the U.S. economy, it did not interfere with the flow of crude oil 
supplies due to the fact that there was no war on the regions of oil-producing economies. 
Oil production facilities were not destroyed.  
In comparison, the Arab oil incarnation of 1973-1974 weakened the flow of oil imports, 
but clearly determined the state of the U.S. economy (Killian 2008). In the case of the 
Iranian Revolution, oil prices began to rise in May 1979, after outsourcing oil supplies 
to Iran. 
Finally, when the Iran-Iraq war broke out in the late 1980s, production fluctuations, the 
Venezuelan crisis in late 2002 and the Iraq war in early 2003 led to a rise in crude oil 
prices. Among the objective indicators of oil supply fluctuations associated with Middle 
East secondary activity, changes in the actual price of oil (Killian 2008) are unlikely to 
be one percent. Third, several subsequent observational studies suggest that large oil 
prices since the end of 1973 have had a significant endogenous dimension to the global 
trading cycle. 
An example is the 1973-1974 era, which saw the largest increase in the actual price of 
crude oil in history of modern times. Over a six-month period, the nominal price of oil 
has quadrupled. On the other hand, the exogenous oil supply measures suggested by 
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Hamilton (2003) and Killian (2008) justified the 25% increase in oil prices in 1973-
1974. 
This answers the question behind the rise in oil prices. The response is that, by 
definition, an increase of at least 75% in oil prices should be due to fluctuations in oil 
demand. This response differs significantly from the Hamilton (2003) proposal, but is 
based on independent evidence. 
According to Barsky and Killian (2002), in the early 1970s, with all the intensities in 
the economic cycle of the Japan, United States and Europe, for the first time in history, 
global demand in all consumer product markets increased. Between November 1971 
and February 1974, the actual price of industrial raw materials and metals increased by 
about 95%, while the actual price of oil increased by 125%. 
Furthermore, in the absence of supply shocks, non-oil industrial production prices rose 
by about 75%, as evidenced by the direct evidence for oil demand, associated with a 
75% increase in the actual price of oil. 
Furthermore, we can assume that the rise in commodity prices in the early 1970s was 
not driven by high oil prices, as non-commodity prices rose significantly when 
bureaucratic pressure lowered crude oil prices. 
Flow Demand Shocks 
Shocks to currents associated with the global economic cycle were the main 
determinants of the rise in oil prices in 1973-1974, with evidence of several significant 
oil price changes. Flow demand is the demand for oil used directly by the production 
of refined goods such as gasoline, diesel, cooking oil, kerosene and jet fuel. 
Since oil is an important component of the industrial economy, demand for oil will 
increase as the global economy grows. Consequently, it is not unexpected that the true 
price of oil, determined by the state of the world economy, is that all things being equal. 
However, the importance of flow demand in determining the optimal price of oil has 
been greatly reduced. 
Barsky and Killian (2002) were the first to identify flow demand as an important factor 
of the true price of crude oil. 
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Barsky and Killian (2002) use indirect data, such as co-movements in oil and other 
commodity prices, to link the cycle to fluctuations to prove that the world economy 
created large oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s.  
To improve the actual price of oil, the researchers were only able to measure the 
demand-shock value. This research indicates a structured vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model of the global crude oil market since 1973. VAR allows the true value of the oil 
to decrease as it deals with demand and supply fluctuations (Killian 2009). He suggests 
that the actual price of oil has risen further since the 1970s, which is linked to the mixed 
effects of oil demand rather than oil supply shocks. 
In recent years, Killian (2009)'s analytical approach has improved, but the summary of 
results has not changed. For instance, Killian and Hicks (2013) show that flow demand 
shocks from 2003 to 2008 were in allingment with the errors produced by experienced-
GDP forecasts. Killian and Murphy (2012) examined the significance of the Killian’s 
(2009) results of alternative contrast results, focusing on the characteristics of shock 
responses. 
In the same VAR model, Baumeister and Peersman (2013) also indicate time-changing 
parameters. Killian & Murphy (2014) and Killian & Lee (2014) clearly updated the 
structured oil market model by calling for presence operations in the oil markets, which 
confirms the content of previous results. 
This and other research have shown shocking oil prices worldwide since 1973, in which 
currents play an important role. There is evidence that only the flow supply shock 
played a significant role in the 1990 episode (Killian and Murphy 2014). However, it 
is now generally accepted that flow demand shocks make it clear that significant oil 
price volatility was the cause of oil volatility when Barsky and Killian (2002) first 
suggested it. 
The Role of Expectations in the Physical Market for 
Crude Oil  
The disruption in the supply of flows has not traditionally had an impact on oil prices, 
which does not mean that political developments in the Middle East have been minimal, 
because the events that led to the decline in oil supply were major. There is a change in 
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the oil price perception of the right price. Against demand. Recently this point has 
attracted attention (Killian 2009). 
While changes are not visible for oil shortages, they do have implications for inventory 
holdings. Anyone who ignores the real rise in oil prices in the future will have the 
incentive to save oil for future use, which is a way to reduce current oil demand and 
increase oil production. Gives encouragement. Therefore, instead of changing the 
market for crude oil flows, the change reflects the shock of oil supply demand. The 
systemic VAR oil market models, fully defined by Killian and Murphy (2014), provide 
data on the fluctuations in the oil lists stored above for the ground effect of obsolete 
changes in oil price estimates. 
It is noteworthy that fluctuations in demand for oil lists due to expectations in the 
physical market for crude oil are recognized as shocks. Crude oil speculators buy crude 
for potential use rather than for immediate use. Reversing the rise in oil prices, which 
is equivalent to a decrease in oil supply compared to oil demand, usually leads to 
specific purchases of crude oil. 
This reality takes into account the role of hazardous forces in the physical market for 
oil, with the use of uncontrolled changes and structural models. Killian and Murphy 
(2014) argue that fluctuations in perceptions have played a significant role in many 
important areas, such as the rise in oil prices in the second half of 1979, the fall in oil 
prices in 1986, and the price of oil in 1990.  
However, they did not find any evidence of dangerous market spikes as an explanation 
for the real rise in oil prices between 2003 and 2008. 
Financial Speculation in Oil Futures Markets 
It is discussed greatly about the potential to increase the true value of oil between 2003 
and 2008 in institutional investor transactions in the oil futures markets. The Oil Futures 
Market, established in the 1980s, is a public exchange for oil futures contracts. Futures 
contracts allow buyers to negotiate a certain amount of raw selling price in advance. 
It encourages participants in the oil market to bet on the potential value of oil rather 
than on physical storage. It also serves as an alternative platform for trading. Most 
traders on the exchange have some physical exposure to oil price fluctuations, 
preferring to hedge. Others want to make money without taking risks. After about 2003, 
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the proportion of subsequent traders increased rapidly. The reality is that the positions 
assumed by financial investors after 2003 have shown their  presence in the oil futures 
markets, which have expanded into the physical crude oil market (Alquist & Killian 
2010). 
If this is true, then, since the physical and futures markets are related to the mediating 
position (Alquist & Killian 2010), a change in inventory demand driven by post-2003 
factors can be expected. In fact, this mediation is important to understand how the rise 
in oil futures prices will push up the price of oil in the real market. Therefore, using the 
same pattern that highlighted the role of demand in the physical market for oil, the 
theory that financial traders have been responsible for the rise in oil prices since 2003 
is unknown. 
Killian and Murphy (2014) and Killian and Lee (2014) showed that there was no such 
risk situation in the physical oil market after 2003. This exploration indicates trading 
pressure in the oil futures market, in line with persistent expectations of intermediation.  
An open problem in this literature is that the existence of financial investors in the oil 
futures markets affects the risk premium in those markets, which have been considered 
historically stable over time. 
Although this possibility has been widely discussed by economists in recent years, some 
studies have definitively determined the development of risk premiums over time. 
Alquist and Killian (2010) argue that there is no evidence for premature risk premiums 
in the oil futures markets based on standardized inspections in the Fama and French 
(1987) study, which applies to data ending in 2006. 
According to Hamilton and Wu (2014) based on the term structure model, the risk 
premium has been close to zero since 1990, but since then it has been quite unusual to 
average close to zero. It is unclear what this recent evidence suggests. Realizing the 
effects of time volatility on the risk premium for the actual price of oil in the physical 
markets requires the development of new models of relations between the physical and 
financial oil markets, for example the Fattouh and Mahadeva (2013) model. Fattouh 
and Mahadeva concluded that the change in risk premium between 2003 and 2008 
would not increase the real price of oil. This is something that is still being researched. 
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The hypothesis of Sakin and Jiang (2013), an alternative theoretical theory of the 
economicization of oil futures markets, is that oil buyers misunderstand external 
fluctuations in oil futures prices as a sign of real economic growth. It is difficult to align 
this aspect with the complete construction of oil market model. 
Furthermore, Hu and Xiong (2013) prove that there is no empirical evidence. Relevant 
works suggest that the rise in oil futures prices will have a direct impact on the actual 
price of oil in the physical oil market, without having an impact on crude oil inventories. 
This argument suggests that oil futures prices can be used to estimate the purchase cost 
of U.S. refineries over a relevant period of time, although any such relationship could 
prove to be the cause of this argument (Alquist 2013). 
Many literatures on financial control issues have realized since 2003 that the growth of 
financial investors in the physical market has been slower than in the crude market. 
This idea is very skeptical. 
Investors exist in the oil futures market for a reason. In particular, the recent rise in 
demand for emerging Asian commodity index funds may draw investors into the oil 
market in the belief that strong returns on commodity prices will continue in the future. 
Consequently, it is more appropriate to consider their behavior as part of an expansion 
of the previous flow demand rather than a new and isolated shock. 
This approach refers to recent analytical models such as the Basak and Pavlova model 
(2013). Such a pattern means that the role of institutional investors in the oil futures 
market from 2007 to 2008 exacerbated the true cost of the oil response to demand flows. 
The quantitative significance of these expansion pathways is unknown. 
The Role of OPEC 
Another reason for the volatility of oil prices is that since the end of 1973, the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been mandatorily 
controlling oil prices. OPEC claims to be the cartel that directly or indirectly controls 
oil prices. This interpretation is incorrect in the literature (Smith 2005). There are no 
indications that OPEC has been able to pick up oil prices so far, or that it has historically 
been able to prevent oil prices from collapsing in 1986 and 1999. 
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According to oil market historians, OPEC activities were chaotic in the 1970s, with 
little cooperation among its members (Skeet 1988). It was only in the early 1980s that 
OPEC sought to assume the role of a monopoly to control oil prices from collapsing. 
Due to absence of cooperation from other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia has 
unilaterally reduced the production of oil elsewhere in the world. Some OPEC member 
states are included. 
This effort failed due to delay in the actual price of oil, but did not stop. Saudi oil sales 
have declined as the price of crude oil has fallen and the amount of oil that Saudi Arabia 
sells has begun to decline, and this perspective has proven to be volatile. The OPEC 
Cartel was abolished in late 1985, as expected from the cartel model (Green & Porter 
1984). Since then, OPEC made no meaningful effort to regulate oil markets. That is not 
to say that the oil industry is not competitive. 
Numerous experiments have been conducted in the oil industry to create impractical 
behavior (Almogura 2011). In this context, the particularly intriguing question is how 
to turn the traditional place in Saudi Arabia’s oil markets into a last resort (Nakov and 
Nuno 2013) as a provider. 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF EXOGENOUS OIL PRICE 
SHOCK 
Early literature on the spread of oil price shocks reflects the bias of many economists 
with the OPEC supply shocks exposed in the oil markets. The actual price of oil is often 
formulated as the Exogenous Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) method 
(Atkeson & Kehoe 1999, Leduc & Sill 2004). 
It’s clear that demand does not affect the actual price of oil and that all oil shocks are 
the same and are caused entirely by oil supply shocks. The general approach of this 
nature has been controversial in recent oil market literature as discussed above. The 
simplification is maintained of the true value of oil as it facilitates the interpretation of 




The Direct Effects of an Exogenous Oil Price Shock on 
Real GDP 
The effects of exogenous variability on the actual price of imported crude oil have been 
central to many analytical models of oil price spread. These oil price shocks are 
transmitted through two primary networks. 
The abrupt rise in the price of imported crude oil reduces the purchasing power of 
domestic households, which in turn transfers income abroad (Alquist & Killian 2010). 
In the macroeconomic model of total demand and total supply, this first result 
corresponds to unfavorable total demand. The other immediate consequence is that it 
will increase domestic production to a level that will lead to oil production with capital 
and labor, resulting in a negative supply shock. These reasons for the rise in the real 
price of oil imports are symmetrical in both the rise and fall of oil prices. 
An unexpected increase in the real price of oil leads to a decrease in total production 
and a decrease in revenue, because the true value of oil inadvertently leads to an 
increase in total production and revenue (Alquist & Killian 2010). 
Direct effects: supply channel of transmission.  
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) of oil importing economies expands 
the insights derived from textbook models of total demand and total supply. The 
traditional solution is to assume oil as an intermediary supply in domestic production 
and ignore the broadcast market channel. 
The increase in the external price of imported crude oil is considered a trade shock (Kim 
and Loungani 1992). 
Three well-known problems arise when trying to justify a real GDP decline using this 
intermediate input cost or supply channel. One problem is when oil is imported, crude 
oil is treated as an intermediary input for a value-added production function. According 
to traditional beliefs, imported oil is included in domestic GDP performance, but not in 
the domestic value added production function (Rotemberg & Woodford 1996). 
Since gross output differs from value added and imported energy, oil price shocks have 
little effect on price, but capital and labor remain constant. 
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In theory, oil price shocks could not be seen as real GDP productivity shocks (Barsky 
and Killian 2004). The second problem is that oil prices affect domestic production and 
their impact should be limited by the share of oil costs in GDP, which can be very small 
without normal growth. 
For example, Kilian and Vigfusson (2013) indicate that crude oil production and 
imports have increased from 1% to 8% of US GDP since 1973. 
There are three ideas in the literature to solve these problems. There are three significant 
changes in the baseline DSGE model of the oil-import economy to produce the 
quantitatively significant effects of exogenous oil price fluctuations on domestic real 
GDP. 
The first forecast, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), relied on high and time-changing 
markups to produce the large impact of oil price shocks on real GDP. 
The putty-clay model proposed by Atkeson & Kehoe's (1999) appeals to capital-energy 
supplements in development. 
Finn (2000) points to a third, which is based entirely on a competitive model in which 
resources are needed to obtain power to achieve cash flow. 
Since the supply channel for the transmission of energy price shocks is quantitatively 
related to all three models, there is no empirical support for either of these models. 
Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether these models are an important part of the 
volatility of the market cycle in any US real GDP. 
 
Direct effects: demand channel of transmission.  
Apart from these problems, another branch of the literature points out that the demand 
for products and services is declining due to the shock of oil prices. According to this 
view, the mainstream broadcasting system places itself on the demand side of the 
economy. For instance, in a study on the impact of fuel price fluctuations, he 
emphasizes that fuel price shocks can affect the economy, disrupt consumers, and be a 
large process of spending on goods not related to energy (Hamilton 2009). 
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Modern dynamic optimization macroeconomic models, including domestic oil 
consumption, allow this possibility (Dhawan & Jeske 2008, Bodenstein & Guerrieri 
2011). 
Rising electricity costs will reduce household renewable income so consumers will 
have less money to spend after giving them for their energy bills. With a high renewable 
income effect, the rest are the same, but with a completely unqualified energy demand, 
the size of the impact of unit changes on energy prices is offset by the share of energy 
in consumption. The average share of total energy expenditure in US consumer 
purchases is 6%. 
According to Edelstein and Killian (2009), the implicit decline in consumer spending 
led to a significant decline in real GDP. According to Hamilton (1988), cost reduction 
can be accelerated by increasing energy consumption durability maintenance costs. 
Since the dollar value of such transactions can exceed the energy used, even a slight 
increase in energy costs can have a large impact on production and jobs. 
This effect was confirmed by evidence in Edelstein Killian (2007,2009), but only for 
car transactions. There is no evidence to support this claim about energy consumption 
durability such as refrigerators and other appliances. Since auto sales account for a 
limited portion of total costs, the net impact on the total GDP that can be explained by 
this method is moderate. 
 
 
The Direct Effects of an Exogenous Oil Price Shock on 
Inflation 
Recent empirical research suggests that the domestic supply channel is small and that 
the domestic demand channel is in fact prime. For example, stock returns in the Killian 
and Park (2009) studies are associated with fluctuations in oil prices, such as final 
market demand, retail sales, and tourism, compared to returns on stocks. The use of 
multiple resources, such as the chemical industry, can cause more harm. 
In addition to the evidence of how this policy will affect the U.S. sectors (Lee and Ni 
2002), economic growth will be significantly delayed by the belief of many 
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policymakers that rising energy costs will affect consumer purchases. On this basis, the 
shock of the external oil price, even if it alone, leads to recession and every inflation. 
In fact, an increase in oil prices will reduce overall demand and total supply. Such a 
change would lead to a slowdown in real GDP, while at the same time partially 
mitigating the impact of oil price shocks. 
This approach does not fit into the widespread belief of macroeconomists that the shocks 
of external oil prices are recession and high inflation. That explanation is very difficult 
to understand. If the external oil price spike causes a negative change in the overall 
supply curve, forcing the price level to rise, long-term inflation is not necessary in the 
absence of a real wage scenario (Bruno and Sachs 1982). 
There is no clear evidence for the policy of price bubbles that unions have been trying 
to raise wages, and the lack of price fluctuations arising from oil price shocks. At least 
in the United States. 
In fact, as Hamilton has argued, reversing domestic inflation from oil imports (2012) is 
a challenge. In fact, very little has been asked about whether raising import prices is 
really risky, whether it is really impossible, and whether we can bet on the monetary 
policy response that will affect pass-through levels. 
Based on monetary policy theories, evidence suggests that, in general, unpredictability 
in oil prices is equivalent to a single adjustment in price levels, having as a result a stable 
inflation rate (Killian and Lewis 2011). After Killian and Lewis (2011) calculated the 
response to oil monetary policy in the mid-1980s, the mixed effects of oil price shaking 
proved difficult to justify the overall rise in US consumer price inflation. Even after 







Financial Indication Data 
Recent NYMEX WTI futures settlement prices are taken from the Bloomberg data 
stream and as NYMEX WTI futures contracts are actively traded, these prices are 
considered to be the global benchmark. Bloomberg is used to obtain exchange rates 
and stock market prices for selected countries.
 
          Figure 1. Daily WTI crude oil prices between January 2005 and April 2016. 
 
             Figure 2. t-copula dependence parameters for 1 to 30 days returns of exchange rates. 
Source: Killian and Lewis 2011 
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In recent history, the impact of oil prices on global issues has been well documented. 
The five most notable events of the last four decades are: the Iraq war in 1990, the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 9–11 attacks in 2001, the low spare capacity in 2004, 
and the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The third of these led to the most dramatic price change. To capture the impact of such 
market shocks, we examine historical data from 2005. This date was chosen to 
eliminate past regional crises and administrative developments that have affected the 
chain trend. 
In addition, a sufficient number of conclusions were reached during this period (2005–
2016) to confirm the accuracy of the results (Fig. 1). Daily citations are used for all 
series from January 10, 2005 to April 6, 2016, and missed days due to official holidays 
are repeated by a combination of near before and after comments. All series are 
translated into log-returns for analysis. The analysis uses exchange rates in US dollars 
and the most representative stock index of ten countries. Table 2 displays data statistics 
for regular and monthly exchange rate return collections. Mean and median returns for 
regular and monthly views are zero, standard deviations for monthly returns are higher 
than daily earnings, and standard deviations for WTI, Brazilian and South African  are 
also much higher. Also, since the currency systems are not independent, the Chinese 
yuan has slight standard deviations (Killian and Lewis 2011). 
Negative distortion values for all exchange rates are very rare and they are low for 
normal results. All returns had high kurtosis, which explained the thick tail and the 
unexpected backlash of the comments. The Jarque Bera Normality measure is 
discarded for the most part in all regular series and monthly series. 
Detailed statistics for regular and monthly stock returns are shown in Table 3. For 
regular and monthly scenes, the average and median returns are zero. The standard 
deviations of WTI, Russia and Turkey are relatively high and they are higher than the 
normal range of monthly values. Unlike the regular series, with the exception of the 
Chinese and Indian indexes, all monthly return series have a left curved distribution. 
Returns are characterized by deep kurtosis, especially for Canadian and Turkish 
indices. kurtosis values are also higher for the normal return sequence. The null 
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hypothesis of normality is ignored.
 




            Figure 4. t-copula dependence parameters for 1 to 30-day returns of Turkish market indices. 














Oil price fluctuation data on stock returns in various 
markets 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, Thailand, Jordan, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Egypt, Morocco, South 
Africa, China, India, Indonesia, Poland, Venezuela and Macau were studied. 
The data set compiled by the MSCI Barra Database (Morgan Stanley Capital 
International) includes indicators that are regularly closing for individual emerging 
markets and the Global Stock Exchange. 
This theory is valid for ten years, from 29 September 1997 to 2 November 2007, with a 
total of 2,512 daily observations. The year 2008-2010 was deliberately omitted from our 
study to avoid significant distortions in the oil-stock price relationship as a result of the 
global financial crisis. There is a smaller dataset than Basher and Sadorsky (2006), 
which allows us to consider countries such as China, Russia, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. This is important because the economic growth and consumer growth of these 
countries are largely dependent on oil and refined goods (Basher and Sadorsky 2006), 
All data are expressed in US dollars, to ensure consistency in achieving their 
homogeneous properties and to avoid currency risk effects on probation performance. 
In terms of oil advertising, we use the daily closing prices of the West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures contract from the US Energy Information 








The agreement was awarded by CME Group, the world's largest futures exchange, and 
is commonly used as a trading index for crude oil markets and other oil-related 
commodities.
  
Source: Basher and Sadorsky (2006), 
 
In our analysis, the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System spent three month 
bills in the U.S. The Treasury, and is considered one of the lowest volatile investments 
in the world, used as a surrogate for risk-free rates. We have the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Dollar based Trade Weighted Exchange Index, which we use to indicate 
exchange rate volatility. 
This sequence contrasts with the variable average of the foreign currency value of the 
US dollar against the currencies of the U.S. major trading partners, weighing the 
equivalent of the share of these partners in the total U.S. trade. 
An increase in the index value of a country indicates an increase in the purchasing power 





Treasury bills derived from daily log returns on individual emerging stock market 
indicators. A similar method was used to earn global market revenue in excess of the 3-
month T-bill rate. The log difference vector of the trade-weighted exchange index is 
used to measure TWEX, which indicates the exchange rate risk factor. 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for survey results. The average daily return in 
emerging capital markets ranges from -0.057 percent (Venezuela) to 0.048 percent 
(Czech Republic). During the study period, twenty-five emerging markets experienced 
thirteen negative returns. 
In terms of positive returns achieved by all member markets, Emerging Europe 
continues to perform well. The standard deviation of the unconditional risk indicator 
indicates that emerging markets are more volatile than global market indicators, as 
shown by their broader standard deviation. 
Indonesia and Russia have the highest risk (0.033), while Morocco has the lowest risk 
with a standard deviation of 0.009. It is worth remembering that twenty-eight emerging 
markets have a negative curve in eighteen and all have high levels of kurtosis, indicating 
that the probability of finding unfavorable extreme values is much higher than normal 
distribution. These features of stock return distribution, as stated by Basher and 
Sadorsky (2006), overlap the turbulent episodes of global financial markets, which can 





Fig. 1. Oil dependence profile of emerging countries in 1997–2006. Graph the annual balance of trade in 
crude oil for the sample countries .Data are obtained from the US Energy Information Administration and 
are expressed in thousand barrels per days. 
Source: Basher and Sadorsky (2006), 
The standard deviation of 0.024, which is favorable and especially important for daily 
oil returns (0.060 percent), reflects the benefits of the portfolio allocation to oil and oil 
reserves during the period under consideration. The average yield on a three-month U.S. 
Treasury bill is 0.039 percent, a very small change over time. 
By definition, a negative value of the TWEX measure indicates the depreciation of the 
dollar against a basket of foreign currencies. 
To examine the complexities of stock market returns, a blow-bar test and two widely 
used unit route tests for normality were selected. Due to the results reported in the last 
three columns of Table 1, the null hypothesis of normality is strongly rejected for all 
categories considered, while the stable state only rejects the normal yield on the 3 month 
US Treasury bill.  
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Overall, these results suggest that our data are set to examine the complex relationship 
between oil and emerging financial markets. 
Due to the dependence on petroleum products, stock returns in developing countries 
behave differently in terms of various factors such as oil price volatility. It will be 
interesting to break down the initial model before analyzing the price relationship. There 
are many developing countries in our model with different oil profiles (China, India, 
Venezuela and Russia), with the result that there are some differences about the impact 
of oil on stock returns. Many scholars who have studied the economic impact of oil 
shakes have noted the specialization in oil-importing and oil-exporting countries 
(Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2004). 
Net oil export or net oil import amount is used to calculate the level of oil dependence. 
Net oil imports or net oil exports were obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) for an average of 10 years per year from 1997 to 2006 and are by 
volume. 
The end is found in fig. 1. Our survey of twenty-five countries is divided into three sub-
models based on their oil dependence: the largest oil importing country, the relatively 
oil-based country and the largest oil exporting country.  In the absence of internationally 
recognized status, countries choose to include them in the sub-sample if their annual 
crude oil exchange balance has the lowest standard deviation. In doing so, we will group 
countries with similar characteristics in terms of crude oil exchange. 
Over the past decade our sub-sample of top crude importers has imported 700,000 
barrels of net crude oil per day to four countries: China, South Korea, Taiwan and India. 
At the time of the study, China and India were the second and third largest energy 
consumers in the world, respectively, and both economies relied heavily on energy 
imports. Between 2004 and 2009, India's net oil imports nearly doubled to $ 50.9 billion. 
According to the International Energy Agency, China will succeed the United States as 
the world's largest oil importer by 2025, and India will succeed Japan as the world's 
third largest importer by 2020. 
Eighteen developing member states for crude oil include Turkey, Thailand, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Morocco, Jordan, Hungary, Peru, Egypt, Brazil, Philippines, Poland, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina and Colombia. Their annual 
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crude oil exchange varies from the remaining 470 thousand barrels per day (Turkey) to 
313 thousand barrels per day (Russia) (Colombia). 
Our third sample includes three major crude oil exporters, Mexico, Russia and 
Venezuela, each with a net annual trade surplus of over 1900 thousand barrels per year. 
Dependence on crude oil and changes in oil prices can make a difference in emerging 
markets. 
Developing countries such as South Korea, China, India and Taiwan have faced rising 
energy costs, especially during high global oil prices which have affected the company’s 
behavior, consumers and governments. With the rise of crude oil prices, these countries 
need to subsidize energy-related goods to sustain rapid economic growth. 
During the 1997-2006 cycle, Mexico and Venezuela had the highest net oil export 
volumes in Latin American growth, averaging two thousand barrels per day. It is 
established that oil export earnings are an important determinant of economic growth in 
these countries and that their economies have benefited from the high oil prices of 2008. 
However, Mexico's oil production is declining and proven reserves are declining 
rapidly. 
Many expect the country to be a net importer of crude oil in the coming years. Overall, 
the group of our countries in the above categories will change over time and should 









Oil price influence on market data 
 
This study uses data from quarterly observations from 1998 to 2015 to estimate the 
causal relationship between oil price fluctuations and stock returns, with 70 
observations being made over a period of time. The model is representative of the 
BRICS countries, which differ in terms of oil properties. After Lee (1992), let us look 
at five variables: real stock return (STR), real oil prices (oil), industrial production (IP), 
nominal exchange rates (NEER), inflation rates (information) and real interest rates 
(RIR). 
Actual oil prices (obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA)) are 
quoted in each country's currency and are rejected by the consumer price index in that 
country. Econstats provides the rest of the data for Industrial Production (IP), Nominal 
Exchange Rate (NER), Inflation Rate (INF) and Real Interest Rate (IR). In addition to 
the availability of Brazilian and Chinese data, a similar sample period was required for 
all countries investigated. 
Furthermore, by analyzing the possible inequalities and dimensional deviations 
between natural logarithms and sequences, this analysis replaces all the variables under 
consideration. The time sequence for creating a quarter-quarter time series is varied, 
followed by a mean of zero and a variation of one. 
Detailed statistical results are shown by the log steps in Table 1 except Brazil. For all 
the countries surveyed, the stock returns and real oil price survey instrument is positive. 
The real oil price distortion (excluding Russia) is negative, while the curve of stock 
returns around the surveyed countries is negative and positive, which is noticeable in 
the case of oil. With the exception of Brazil, kurtosis is less important than oil, which 
means that the distribution is less flat than the Gaussian distribution. In contrast, 
















The results of this study indicate sharp differences in work-cause orientation that are 
different from previous research on this topic. Considering the relevant regulatory 
variables, this analysis examines the expected impact of oil prices on stock market results 
from 1998 to 2015. The results for each of the BRICS countries are given below. Fig. 1 
describes the test data with their 5% critical value interval. 
We test whether the actual oil price granger-cause is the actual stock return at different 
frequency. Based on the results three main classes can be identified. 
The first includes Brazil and Russia, where there is support for a long-term causal 
relationship between stock returns and real oil price movements. 
Other concerns include China, where work-cause is well supported in the short and long 
term. 
The third group includes India and South Africa, where short-term work is the reason. The 
null hypothesis of oil price does not give the granger-caused real stock return in Brazil. 
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Low frequency frequency oil prices (wave lengths greater than 7.2 quarters and less than 
18.8 quarters) have the potential to power financial markets. In Russia, there is a major 
causal relationship between real oil price changes and real stock returns in the lowest 
frequency band. 
The null hypothesis supports the ω value from 0.01 to 1.20. (More than 5.8 quarters). 
Real Oil Price Granger-Caused Stock Returns for India. Less than 2.60. (Less than 2.4 
quarters, see Figure 1 c). 
The Chinese experience looks clearly different, especially when the cause of the work 
is found in a large cycle that is subject to fluctuations between 0.01 and 1.30. (Medium 
and long-term, see Figure 1 D). 
Meanwhile, the South African stock market has been less affected by fluctuations in 
the oil markets, with further setbacks to oil prices. 
More precisely, in the case of South Africa, a short-term causal relationship was found 
from oil prices to stock market returns, where 70 is between 2.70 and 3.03 (less than 















 Figure 1 The frequency domain causality between oil price and real stock returns 










Alternative explanations of oil price fluctuation data 
The price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil is plotted in Figure 1 of this 
segment of the study from 1948 to 1973. This premium is almost equal to the crude oil 
producer price index in the United States. There was no world demand for crude oil during 
this time span. The United States was actually sufficient on its own in crude oil.
 
Figure 1 Price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil 1948-1973 , source: Killian and Park (2009) 
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The value of Fig. 1 is different from the chain of traditional commodity markets in which 
the price of oil is stable in the long run ,with occasional large varied changes. 
This trend reflects the fact that the government controls the price of oil in the United 
States. Crude oil prices have been regulated by government agencies such as the Texas 
Railroad Commission since the 1920s, which worked to control the oil industry during 
the Texas Rail Boom. 
As discussed in Hamilton (1983), they did so by estimating US oil demand and setting 
production targets accordingly, resulting in generally consistent prices. On the other hand, 
to take advantage of these results in the sudden rise in large oil prices, regulators cannot 
tolerate unexpected unforeseen oil supply delays from time to time. 
The system ended in 1971 when the United States became a net exporter of crude oil. By 
the end of 1973, the United States, like other developed countries, was increasingly 
dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil imports. The global crude oil industry has 
expanded. Because of this, it has become impossible for US government agencies to 
continue to control the price of crude oil in the United States. 
Despite the fact that the price of domestic crude oil production was somewhat controlled 
until the early 1980s, regulators allowed the price to constantly shift toward the global 
world price. Figure 2 shows the transition towards the global crude oil economy. The left 
panel of Figure 2 shows the actual percentage rate of increase in WTI value. 
The lower instability of the series is truncated by periodic spikes, which indicate 
individual changes in nominal value.  
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Prior to 1974, there was only one monthly oil value chain for all purposes.
 
Figure 2 Percent change in the real price of oil. RAC denotes the US Refiners' Acquisition Cost as 
reported by the US Energy Information Administration, and WTI denotes West Texas Intermediate. 
Source: Killian and Park (2009) 
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the percentage change in the purchase cost of actual 
US refiners for the WTI sequence, including imported crude oil and domestically supplied 
crude oil. The graph shows that by the end of 1973 the timing process for controlling oil 
prices had changed. 
Since 1974, the real price volatility of oil has begun to mimic other property prices 
determined in global markets. In the left panel of Fig. 2 it can be argued that fluctuations 
in oil prices are an exception to the world economy, which means that the world 
macroeconomic aggregates cannot justify these price increases. Since 1974, the true price 
of oil has been endogenous in relation to global consumer economic factors, including 
the actual prices of other consumer goods (Alquist 2013). 
On the one hand, fluctuations in the real price of oil impact the macroeconomic output of 
oil-importing countries such as the United States. 
Changes in macroeconomic conditions in oil-importing countries, on the other hand, have 
an impact on the actual price of oil. Identifyινγ the cause and effect of the relationship 
between the actual price of oil and macroeconomic conditions in oil importing economies, 
leading to a global economy with a global oil industry. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON OIL 
SHOCKS 
We provide evidence of how the model's parameters have evolved over time. We will 
derive the probabilities of a split at any point in time from the mixture innovation 
definition. It is not possible to present all posterior probabilities of jumps analytically 
for and parameter and time frame. 
Table 3 shows the average split probabilities over the whole sampling time t = 1,...,T. 
Table 3 shows the posteriors of the transformation probabilities for the three 
parameters, αt, log σt, and at. The value for αt represents the incremental progression 
of regression coefficients (with a change probability of 0.281, a split of αt occurs once 
every 4 months). 
In our time-varying parameter structural VAR model, values for variance–covariance 
matrix elements at and log σt above 0.9 imply a high likelihood of shift at any point in 
time. 
In their mixture breakthrough time-varying parameter VAR models of the transmission 
of US monetary policy, Koop et al. (2009) and Korobilis (2013) found related 
observations of time difference in all of the parameters. 
Fig. 3 depicts the posterior means in coefficients of each vector with lag 1 in the actual 
stock return equation to demonstrate the time-varying value of parameters: that is, the 
coefficients of the lag of oil supply (Δprod t-1), aggregate demand (Δrea t-1), real price 
of oil (Δrpo t-1) and real return (ret t-1) in the structural VAR model's fourth equation. 
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Source: Wensheng Kang, Ronald A. Ratti, Kyung Hwan Yoon (2015) 
 
The posterior coefficient of global real economic activity in the real stock return 
equation has decreased since the late 1990s, while the posterior coefficient of oil price 
induced by oil-market specific demand shocks has fluctuated, being relatively high 
before 1988 and lower afterwards, especially from 1995 to 2001 and since 2006. 
In the real stock return equation, the posterior coefficients of global oil supply and real 
return have stayed constant. 
The posterior means of simultaneous effects among endogenous variables in the 
structural VAR model are seen in Fig. 4, that is the posterior means of non-zero and 
non-one elements of the lower triangular matrix At over time. It's worth noting that 
allowing the matrix At to change over time is critical for our time-varying structural 
VAR model. 
All of the plots in Fig. 4 change significantly with time, showing that a change in oil 
production and demand prices has a time-varying impact on real oil prices in the United 
States and real stock returns in the United States. The simultaneous interactions among 
variables are critical since we construct the model's structural VAR representation 
across the relationship. 
εt = At





Fig. 3. Posterior means of coefficients of variables with t -1 in the real stock return equations in 
U.S., 1973–2012. Notes: This figure shows posterior means of coefficients of each variable with 
lag 1 in the real stock return in the U.S. stock market. 
 
Fig. 4. Posterior means of simultaneous effects in U.S., 1973:07–2012:12. Notes: This figure shows 
simultaneous effects between variables that are the elements of lower triangle matrix At in the structural 
VAR model. 
 
Fig. 5. Posterior means of standard deviations of errors in the VAR equations in U.S., 1973:07–2012:12. 
Notes: This figure shows posterior means of standard deviations of errors of each equation in the 
structural VAR model described in the U.S. stock market. 




The inverse paths of the square root of the diagonal elements of Ht are given in Fig. 5 
as the path behind the standard deviation of the errors of each equation in the structured 
VAR model. The deviation of the residual shake is seen by the posterior of the standard 
deviation of the residue. Calculations of oil production, as seen in Figure 5, vary 
significantly with volatility, total demand, precautionary demand and actual return time. 
The standard deviations of the residue in the Global Real Economic Activity equation 
fluctuate over time, with a maximum of forty years during and after GFC. Since the 
mid-1980s, the standard deviation of the residue in the oil-market primary demand 
equation has increased, peaking during the GFC. 
Since the mid-1990s, the standard deviation of residues in the global oil supply equation 
has been lower than ever before. The standard deviation of the residue in the real return 
equation fluctuates over time, with higher values after GFC, but in line with those 














An important work has been done as a result of research on the important relationship 
between oil and financial markets. A deeper understanding of these relationships can 
have significant consequences for a better understanding of real and financial 
economies. 
Much of the literature believes that the main relationship between the oil and financial 
markets as well as the real economy has changed over time. Extensive literature on oil 
price share return relationships reveals systemic changes, uncertainties over time, and 
differences over time. 
I conclude that it is important to identify the cause of the shock and to investigate the 
time difference of the two coefficients and the variations of the potential covalent 
matrix in determining the effect of the oil price shock. 
Using several criteria, this study examines the impact of oil price shocks on stock 
market real returns. I see the effects of oil price reductions on the financial market. 
Oil price shocks have been shown to produce useful information for estimating real 
stock returns. It turns out that the shock coefficient and survival are modified over 
time. Past coefficients of oil prices, driven by global real economic activity and oil-
market specific demand, are small in the latter part of the study on the actual stock 
return equation. 
In comparison, global real economic activity and residual standard deviations in the 
oil-market specific demand equations are negative. The standard deviation of the 
residue in the global real economic activity equation was at its peak during the Great 
Depression and has been strong ever since. Since the mid-1980s, the standard 
deviation of the residue in the oil-market primary demand equation has increased, 
peaking during the Great Recession. Since the mid-1990s, the standard deviation of 
residues in the global oil supply equation has been lower than ever before. 
After the ups and downs from 1973 to 2008, the contribution of shock in terms of real 
stock return diversification increased significantly in 2009. It is associated with a very 
55 
 
high residual standard deviation in the global gross demand equation during and after 
the Great Index. 
From the mid-1970s to 2007, the oil-market grew unevenly, and falling prices hurt the 
real stock return gap. This corresponds to an increase in the residual standard 
deviation in the oil-market primary demand equation since the mid-1980s. 
From 1973 to 2012, the contribution of oil supply shocks to the true stock return 
differential in the United States gradually declined. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, overall demand shocks are very 
important in explaining global real stock returns, and based on current evidence, the 
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